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Chapter I
Introduction

-

Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies What U.S. Enterprises Must Do To
Maintain Global Competitiveness.
Problem Statement

This project proposes to identify numerous Japanese monopolistic
manufacturing activities and how those activities can be addressed by U.S.
enterprises through effective strategic management plans. With this goal in
mind, one could also ask several questions about what, if anything, the federal
government should do to aid U.S. enterprises. Should the federal government
play a role in high-tech markets? Should it protect U.S.-based firms competing in
strategically important industries? Should it attempt to preserve a U.S. industrial
presence in consumer electronics? Should it devise new institutions for assisting
industrial efforts to commercialize technology? As evidence of declining U.S.
industrial strength in high-tech markets grows, these and similar questions are
asked with increasing intensity.'
At an aggregate level, the problem of U.S. industrial competitiveness is
nearly hidden from view. The full extent of the competitiveness problem begins
to reveal itself only when we consider U.S. industry performance in a critical
subset of high-technology markets - markets such as consumer electronics,
factory automation, semiconductor memories, and advanced displays. In these

'.Stuart Hart, "How Strategy-Making Processes Can Make a Difference,"Strateqic
Manaaement Journal, May 1994,251-255.
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markets, Japanese competitors have established strong positions, and U.S.
firms have fared poorly. The significance of the U.S. position is not simply that
Japanese firms have achieved leadership in large and rapidly growing markets,
but that these large and rapidly growing markets are themselves driving
advances in important related markets.
Despite repeated predictions that the high yen would drive Japan's export
industries to the wall, not a single significant Japanese manufacturing company
has gone out of business in recent years. What's sustaining Japan's export
boom? The answer is fairly simple: in a wide range of important products, the
Japanese are now the world's only significant suppliers. Many of these products
are virtually invisible to the American public because they are high-tech
materials, components or production machinery, but without them many
American and European corporations would literally have to shut down. By
establishing leadership in such products, Japan's keiretsus have come to
dominate the upper reaches of the world manufacturing hierarchy and thus enjoy
strong price leadership in a wide range of downstream activities.'
Thanks to the increasing importance of research and development in
advanced manufacturing, the ownership of industries is becoming more and
more concentrated. In many key products, the world is down to just one or two
suppliers. For example, lithographic machines, known as "steppers," perform
some of the most sophisticated work in the semiconductor manufacturing

' ~ a r a hMoore, 'Making Sense of Strategic Management: Towards a Constructive
Guide," Manaaement Decision, January 1995, 19-24.
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industry. Fifteen years ago the stepper market was fiercely contested by
manufacturers in both Japan and the United States. Today just one Japanese
company, Nikon, accounts for approximately 70 percent of the global market.
The only other major supplier is Canon, another Japanese company. The full
significance of Japan's leadership in steppers becomes apparent only when one
realizes that advances in the semiconductor industry are paced by advances in
stepper technology. The more accurate the stepper, the finer the lines that can
be printed on a silicon chip and the more memory the chip can contaim3
Not all the world's monopoly industries are located in Japan. But Japan
has been targeting such monopoly niches for many years. Interestingly, they are
invisible monopolies. Apart from a few well-known categories such as cameras
and fax machines, Japan's areas of monopolistic strength are rarely easy to
identify. This is because neither the Japanese nor their rapidly downsizing
customers in U.S. manufacturing like to acknowledge how hollowed out the
American economy has increasingly become. In many industries dominated by
the Japanese, U.S. corporations seem quite strong. But this is an optical illusion.
Unbeknownst to the American public, U.S. corporations quietly source critical
components or even whole products from Japanese competitors.
A good example is laser printers, whose defining laser components are
built almost exclusively by the Japanese. Even Hewlett-Packard, which ironically
has often been praised for its success in besting the Japanese, depends

3~onaldBates, "Wanted:A Strategic Planner for the 199O9s,"Journal of General
Manaaement, Autumn 1992, 51-53.
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critically on Japan's Canon for key components. Only when unforeseen
circumstances disrupt the world's supplies does the existence of Japan's
monopolies emerge. This was how word got out that Japan monopolizes a
special steel needed to make valve springs for auto engines. For several weeks
in January and February of 1995, this ultra-high-performance steel was in short
supply because the Kobe, Japan earthquake had knocked out a Kobe steel plant
that accounted for nearly 60 percent of the world's supply. Production was
quickly restored and emergency action by other Japanese suppliers reduced any
serious effects on the auto industry. But as the U.S. auto industry noted to its
discomfort, all the alternative suppliers were also Japanese. There are many
other critical areas where Japan enjoys a monopoly or near monopoly p~sition.~

4~amonn
Fingleton, "The Tokyo Gambit," Financial World, 20 June 1995,22-26.
4

Chapter II
Literature Review

Grayson

Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies

Chapter II
Literature Review

Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies - What U.S. Enterprises Must Do To
Maintain Global Competitiveness.
Literature Review

Japan's economic leaders aim to establish monopolistic leadership in
advanced industries. Their success to date has been greater than most
Americans realize and constitutes one of Japan's greatest hidden strengths.
How many economically significant monopolies does Japan now have? As this
question has never been studied systematically by government officials or
scholars, one can only guess. It seems reasonable to assume that monopolistic
leadership is a factor in about one-third of Japan's exports.
Corporate Japan's most important area of monopolistic leadership is
electronics. The seeds of monopoly which Japan has planted here promise a
truly exceptional harvest. The Japanese technology expert Masanori Moritani
has perhaps put it most succinctly, "The silicon revolution," he says, "promises
as big a transformation in the world economy as all other technologies
developed since the eighteenth century put together." This is quite a statement,
but the evidence that it is true is widely apparent to anyone who has looked at
how corporate Japan's control of the electronics industry is giving it growing
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power to shape dozens of other industries, from robotics and factory automation
to cars and aerospace.'
Monopolies of the Electronics Industry

Listed below are several "advantageous positions" that Japanese
companies control in the electronics industry:
Flat panel displays. Japan dominates the industry, especially in large
high-end products such as thin-film transistor liquid crystal displays. These are
the most familiar as the screens in laptop computers, but they are now
indispensable in a wide range of applications not visible to the consumer. Their
weight-saving possibilities have made them essential equipment in military and
commercial aircraft. According to independent consultants, demand is likely to
triple, to about $20 billion, by the year 2000. The United States largest maker of
flat-panel displays, Planar Technologies, accounts for only 3 percent of the
world market. Moreover, like Korean flat-panel makers, it depends on the
Japanese for key inputs such as flat-panel drivers and raw liquid crystal.
Laser diodes. These are already indispensable in compact disk players
and laser printers and now they are critical components for the new multimedia
industry. Japan's global market share is more than 99 percent. Sharp
Corporation's share alone is 40 percent.
Compact disk players and CD-ROM drives. Compact disk players need no
introduction; their more advanced derivatives CD-ROM (compact disk read-only

5~olomonBrothers Research, Forbes, 13 November 1989.
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memory) drives are becoming well known because they are a core technology of
the multimedia revolution. Sony has about 40 percent of the global CD-ROM
market. Other Japanese makers control the rest.6
Capacitors. Murata makes 50 percent of the world's multi-layered ceramic

capacitors, which are essential in almost all electronic devices, and 80 percent
of the world's ceramic filters.
Semiconductor materials and equipmenf. Japan's share of the

semiconductor materials industry rose from 21 percent in 1980 to 73 percent in
1990 and is still rising. Japan's market share appears to be at least 80 percent in
several crucial items including ceramic substrates, silicon wafers, and bonding
wire. Japan also monopolizes the supply of copper foil for printed circuit boards.
Disco Corporation makes 70 percent of dicing saws for cutting silicon wafers.
Two-thirds of the world's quartz masks are made by Hoya, more than 50 percent
of photoresists by Tokyo Ohka Kogyo, and 40 percent of photomasks by Dai
Nippon Printing.
Cellular phones and pagers. A key area of Japanese dominance in

cellular phones is gallium arsenide chips, which operate at higher frequencies
and consume less power than silicon chips. Oki Electric is increasing its gallium
arsenide capacity by 50 percent in 1995 to keep up with booming demand.
Corporate Japan is believed to monopolize the market in surface acoustic wave
devices used in cellular phones.

6

Stuart Aurbach, "Sweating Bullets," Washinaton Post, 25 March 1991.
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Optical character recognition. Optical scanning equipment allows postal
services automatically to sort letters. It is also installed in automated ticket
barriers in the world's most advanced subway systems and in vending and
change-making machines that accept bank notes. Much of the software in these
machines is made in the United States and other Western countries, but the
crucial hardware is almost entirely Japanese. The major manufacturer is
Toshiba, which got its start in a MITI-sponsored research cartel in the 1960's.
Japan also leads in supermarket scanner technology.
Lithographic Sfeppers. These precision machines are vital for making
semi-conductors and liquid crystal displays. Nikon enjoys close to 70 percent of
the booming market for steppers; Canon has almost all the rest.

'

Monopolies of Other Industries

Outside the electronics field, The following sectors have been identified
as several of Japan's most important areas of monopolistic leadership:
The information highway. Although American commentators think of the
information highway as an American stronghold, Japan will make much of the
relevant hardware, including many of the sophisticated asynchronous
transmission mode (ATM) switching systems at the heart of interactive television.
The Japanese have leveraged their expertise in video compression to lead a
new international consortium that will own most of the patents for future video
compression systems: of the eight companies participating in this consortium,

a avid Hamilton, "Specialty Materials," Asian Wall Street Journal, 30 August 1993.
8
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four are Japanese (Sony, Matsushita Electric, Fujitsu, and Mitsubishi Electric),
two are American (AT&T and General Instrument), and two are European
(Thomson and Philips).
Micro-engineering. Japan's micro-engineering expertise is easy to
overlook but it has enabled Japan to establish several important monopolies in
electro-mechanical components. Such components often must be machined to
tolerances measured in microns, or, millionths of a meter. Such precision is a
key reason for the superior reliability of, for example, Japanese videocassette
recorders (whose magnetic heads and drums contain dozens of tiny moving
parts which wear out quickly if they are not precisely aligned). Olympus Optical
recently announced a grinder that grinds steel to a tolerance of one-fiftieth of a
micron.'
Auto parts. America is hardly extinct in auto parts, but Japan leads in
miniaturization. As moving parts get ever smaller, problems of heat and wear are
correspondingly multiplied. The Japanese are acknowledged masters in making
materials which beat these problems. Miniaturization skills helped Japan
establish an effective global monopoly in motorcycles by the early 1970's.
Another important area of Japanese leadership is small compressors for
automobile air-conditioning systems. Japan leads in sensors, displays, gauges,
and other electronic components, which now account for between 5 and 10
percent of the cost of a typical car. The Japanese reputedly have a lock on

8~olomonBrothers Research, Forbes, 13 November 1989.
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plastic optical fibers for controlling a car's electronics; compared to traditional
wires, optical fibers provide important weight and space reductions. The
Japanese reportedly lead in critical future technologies such as lean-burn
chemical catalysts, high-capacity batteries, piezoelectric vibrating gyroscopes
(for navigation systems), and ceramic engine parts (which will improve efficiency
by allowing engines to operate without cooling ~ a t e r ) . ~
Auto industry manufacturing machinery. Much was made recently of
Chrysler's Neon car, which was described by press commentators as Chrysler's
"Japanese car killer." Most reports overlooked the fact that the Neon, like most
other advanced American cars, is made using Japanese presses and other
sophisticated production equipment. Although Schuler of Germany is still a
player in large presses for the auto industry, the category is now led by Japan's
Komatsu. Japan leads in so-called squeeze-mold techniques for the mass
production of strong, precisely engineered aluminum sub-components. Honda is
the world expert in using aluminum in engines.''
Micro-motors. Precise, powerful micro-motors are an important edge for
Japan in everything from cameras to CD-ROMs and laptop computers. Most
micro-motors are made in East Asia using specialized Japanese manufacturing

'~ajirneKaratsu, Nikkei Weekly, 9 June 1994.
'O~redBleakley, "Auto Industry Manufacturing Machinery," Asian Wall Street Journal,
28 June 1993.
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technology. Mabuchi Motor now makes 900 million micro-motors a year,
approximately one for every household in the world."

Bearings. Invisible to the consumer, bearings are a crucial area of
Japanese leadership. They are most familiar as ball bearings, but they come in
many specialized varieties. Bearings are used to relieve friction in virtually every
mechanical process, and Japanese bearings are now vital in precisionengineering applications from videocassette recorders to fighter jets. Because
bearings must combine extreme hardness with precise engineering, they are
made in highly specialized factories, and monopolistic pressures have always
been powerful in the industry. In recent years Japanese companies have
leapfrogged over the American and Swedish companies that previously
dominated the industry, and the United States now imports about 80 percent of
its bearings. Just how strong the monopolistic pressures are in this industry can
be gauged from the story of New Hampshire Ball Bearings, an American defense
supplier that was taken over by Japan's Minebea in 1985. The takeover was
controversial because America's ball bearing capacity had already fallen too low
to meet surge production needs of a conventional war. But Ronald Reagan
personally decided to approve the takeover in an effort to boost then Prime
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's standing in Japan. Although Minebea had
undertaken to expand in the United States, it instead quickly cut back and
allegedly started importing East Asian ball bearings that were repackaged as

" ~ a m e sFallows, Lookina at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and
Political System, (New York: Pantheon Press, 1994), 423.
11
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American-made. Why would Minebea risk offending the United States in such a
serious way? Much of the answer lies in the ball bearing industry's huge
monopolistic pressures that make it unprofitable to operate duplicate factories.
Cameras. The camera industry is a classic Japanese monopoly and it has
conferred classic monopolistic advantages on the Japanese economy. Thanks to
leadership in cameras, Japan rapidly ascended the learning curve in lenses and
miniature motors and thus surpassed the Americans in copiers, semiconductormaking equipment, laptop computers, television broadcasting equipment, and a
host of other seemingly unrelated products that depend on camera technology.
Copiers. The world leaders are the Japanese companies Canon, Ricoh,

and Tokyo-based Fuji Xerox. Many of the sophisticated parts in American-brand
copiers are made in ~apan."
Carbon fiber. Stronger than steel and lighter than aluminum, carbon fiber
has long been a vital material in aviation. Engineers approximate that carbon
fiber components typically reduce a plane's total weight by 8 to 9 percent, a key
advantage in fuel economy and, in the case of warplanes, in range and
maneuverability. Japan is believed to enjoy a monopoly in the special source
material from which most carbon fiber is made. Moreover, Japan specializes in
new low-cost versions of carbon fiber which are expected to make substantial
inroads into the auto industry.13

om Forester, Silicon Samurai, (New York: Oxford Press, 1993),129.
13carbon Fiber: Holding the Edae, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office)
1989,138.
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Titanium. Sumitomo Sitix is the world's leading producer of this

increasingly important metal. Titanium's lightness and corrosion resistance make
it a vital metal in aircraft, chemical plants, nuclear power stations, desalination
plants, space and underwater exploration, automobile manufacturing, and
offshore oil prod~ction.'~

14~amonn
Fingleton, Blindside, (New York: Buttonwood Press, 1995), 68-80.
13
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Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies - What U.S. Enterprises Must Do To
Maintain Global Competitiveness.
Data Gathering Methodologies and Procedures

This project will address this topic with a literature review of published
information available from public and university libraries, and strategic
management databases available from global lnternet sources.
Location of the Information

The secondary sources of information -journals and industry publications

- are available at the library of Florida Atlantic University, the library of Lynn
University, and the Palm Beach County Public Library. Global lnternet sources
will be tapped using Florida Atlantic University's VAX computer and Telnet
resources. Database search tools Gopher, Veronica, and Archie will be used to
access resources available from national lnternet locations.
Obtaining the Information

No complications exist with obtaining the secondary information for this
project. All of the information will be secured from the stacks of the library of
Florida Atlantic University, the library of Lynn University , and the Palm Beach
County Public Library. The material will be reviewed and photocopies of
whatever material requiring further study will be secured.

Chapter IV
Results

Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies

Grayson

Chapter IV
Results

Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies - What U.S. Enterprises Must Do To
Maintain Global Competitiveness.
Results

The major difficulty in identifying Japan's monopolies is that statistics in
this area are often misleading; qualitative factors are involved to an
extraordinary degree. To assess the degree of monopoly one must, for example,
distinguish between different production technologies. Often where the
Japanese have a real monopoly, the Americans still can claim a presence.
Typically one American supplier remains in any particular category who uses
"handmade" production techniques for special-order military applications, while
leaving the vast consumer market entirely to a Japanese cartel.
Many of Japan's monopolies are so obscure that they are virtually
invisible to American executives and government officials. An example is a
substance known as epoxy cresol novolac resin, an ingredient in most
semiconductors. Almost no one in the United States had heard of this substance
before 1993, but things changed fast when an explosion disabled a small factory
in the remote Japanese town of Niihama. As astonished American
semiconductor executives quickly discovered, the factory accounted for nearly
65 percent of the entire world supply.
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Prices of some types of semiconductors doubled on the world market in
the following two weeks. Within a month, the Clinton administration was pressing
the Japanese to take emergency action to restore production. The closer
American officials looked at the epoxy story, the more worried they became.
They found that the Japanese also monopolized both the substance known as
resolving silica, with which the epoxy is mixed before being incorporated in
semiconductors, and the process by which resolving silica and epoxy are mixed.
Thus three links of the manufacturing "food chain" in one hitherto unsung
subdivision of the semiconductor industry had been monopolized by corporate
Japan. Moreover, an alternative technology called ceramic packaging is also a
Japanese monopoly.
In the wake of the Niihama disaster, top American companies like DuPont
and Monsanto were urged to get into the business, but they didn't want to
compete in a Japan-dominated product category. Why did the Niihama explosion
come as such a surprise to the United States? In mapping gaps in America's
technology food chain, Americans have focused narrowly on a few "critical"
technologies of compelling importance to American military security while
ignoring unglamorous civilian technologies. Yet these civilian technologies
account for a much larger share of world economic output.
Another problem in measuring Japanese monopoly is American
corporations' increasing secrecy about their dependence on Japanese supplies..
The secrecy is understandable: because wages are now lower in the United
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States than in Japan, American employers who fire American workers in order to
source from Japan are implicitly confessing they have lost the technology race.
American defense contractors seem particularly secretive, perhaps because
they made large profits in the 1980's by relying on cut-rate components imported
from Japan while turning their backs on struggling American suppliers.
Another difficult qualitative question is to what extent control of apparently
insignificant components gives Japan a monopoly in a whole industry. Does
Japan monopolize the videocassette recorder industry? On paper, no: But in
practice, probably yes, because non-Japanese makers are dependent on Japan
for vital parts. In some industries dominated by corporate Japan, a few nonJapanese suppliers exist in Europe or East Asia. But often such suppliers are de
facto junior partners in the Japanese cartels, and they are located in countries
whose governments turn a blind eye to antitrust concerns. In general, once a
Japanese cartel has captured at least 50 percent of the global market, it can be
presumed to have established monopolistic leadership.
Most Americans seem to think America's growing dependence on
Japanese manufacturing is of little significance. Even the fact that America's
most advanced weapons depend on Japanese components elicits no more than
a shrug from the likes of the Brookings Institution and the Wall Street Journal.
This is globalism, they seem to say; sit back and enjoy it! The complacency
seems to stem from a view that "mutual dependencies" are unavoidable in the
modern global economy. Just as America is becoming dependent on Japan for
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some products, so Japan is supposedly becoming dependent on America for
others.I5
The truth is that the combination of a huge manufacturing work force and
high productivity enable the Japanese economic system to aim for almost
complete self-sufficiency in advanced manufacturing. In the last two decades
Japan has reduced or eliminated its dependence on America in computers and
computer components, telecommunications, machine tools, electronic
manufacturing equipment, and robotics. Perhaps most significantly of all, the
Japanese economic system has been working in a coordinated way to reduce
Japan's dependence on America in aerospace, the last significant manufacturing
industry that America leads. Rather than buy American warplanes, for instance,
Japan decided in the late 1980's to build its own.
One reason American policy-makers have been unconcerned about the
1

loss of American manufacturing power is that they believe the United States can
easily get back into lost industries "in a matter of weeks" in an emergency. This
theory has gone largely unchallenged because there are few hard numbers in
the public domain that would allow academic economists to evaluate it.
On the rare occasions when the theory has been tested by events,
however, it has proved startlingly one-sided. One such occasion was the
Toshiba military secrets scandal of the 1980's. A Toshiba subsidiary was found
to have sold crucial machine tools to the Soviet defense industry. The United

isphilip Trezise, Brooking Review, Winter 1989190, 12.
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States wanted to retaliate by boycotting Toshiba products, but it quickly
discovered it could not do so because many major American manufacturers were
critically dependent on Toshiba for components. There followed one of the most
humiliating episodes in American business history as such high-technology
corporations as AT&T, Hewlett-Packard, and Apple Computer lobbied Capitol
Hill in Toshiba's behalf. Although the companies were understandably
embarrassed to associate their names with such a controversial cause they felt
they had no choice. The estimated damage Toshiba's action had inflicted on
American defenses had been estimated as high as $30 billion. In the end,
Toshiba escaped with a slap on the wrist.'"
An even more significant admission of American dependency came in the
early 1990's, after the small company Japan Aviation Electronics Industry was
indicted by the United States Justice Department for selling defense technology
to Iran. This time, the company turned out to be so important to America's
defense strategy that the United States Defense Department quickly stepped in
to plead successfully to get it off the hook. The message of the Toshiba and
Japan Aviation incidents is clear: Japan's manufacturing prowess is rapidly
becoming a vital tool of global power.
These monopoly positions are crucial to Japan's overall exports. About
one third of Japan's exports consist of goods in which Japan has a monopolistic

"pat Choate, Agent of Influence, Agents of Influence: How Japan's Lobbyists in the
United States Manipulate America's Political and Economic System, (New York: Alfred Knopf,
1990), 8.
19
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lead, up from about a tenth in 1980. Moreover, in many downstream industries
where the U.S. and Europe are apparently strong, the Japanese hold the upper
hand by virtue of upstream monopolies. Thanks to many critical strengths in
producing auto-making equipment and advanced components, the Japanese
have been far less pressured by the high yen than many analysts predicted.
Japan's monopolistic strengths have played a key role in bolstering the
earnings of most of Japan's major export corporations. As a result Japan's
corporate profits have been holding up well despite the rising yen.
Recently, there has been a rising challenge to Japan's monopoly
positions from other east Asian countries. But the Japanese have shown a
remarkable ability to jump to higher levels of monopolistic leadership when their
existing monopolies are cha~lenged.'~

17~ingleton,"Tokyo Gambit," 24-26.
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Chapter V
Discussion I Conclusion

Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies -What U.S. Enterprises Must Do To
Maintain Global Competitiveness.
Discussion I Conclusion

U.S. industry still leads the world in the production of manufactured goods
by a substantial margin, accounting for 30.6 percent of total manufacturing
production among OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development) member countries, compared to 21.6 percent for Japan. The U.S.
share of total OECD production in high technology however, is shrinking (from
40 percent in 1980 to 36 percent in 1990), while Japan's is growing (from 18
percent to 29 percent), but here again, the aggregate data show no sign of
serious difficulty.
The full extent of the competitiveness problem begins to reveal itself only
when one considers U.S. industry performance in a critical subset of hightechnology markets. The significance of this is not simply that Japanese firms
have achieved leadership in large and rapidly growing markets, but that these
large and rapidly growing markets are themselves driving advances in important
related markets. Semiconductors and displays are the building blocks for
electronic equipment. They represent an increasingly large portion of the total
value added in a growing range of high-volume, fast-growing products, such as
laptop computers, fax machines, compact disc players, camcorders, and
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portable telephones. By dominating semiconductor memory and display markets,
Japanese firms build the foundation for dominance in electronic equipment
markets. Once leadership in equipment markets is established, it reinforces
leadership in

component^.'^

Here then can be seen the full range of the competitiveness problem. The
strongest Japanese competitors are focusing on large, fast-growing industries
that are the foundation for even larger, more widespread, future industries, and
when U.S. firms go head to head against their Japanese counterparts in those
industries, most fare poorly. The real issue in competitiveness is not leadership
in the aggregate, but leadership where it matters most. The cause for alarm is
not the marginal decline in U.S. industry's share of overall global production but
the striking failures in specific domains of long-term strategic importance.lg
Technology Leadership

What can government do to help U.S.-based firms compete in global
markets?
Build advantage through technology leadership. Better technology leads
to superior products at lower or competitive costs, which in turn offsets the
structural advantages enjoyed by the competition. The same is true for most U.S.
companies competing in high-tech markets. A primary objective for U.S. policy-

"~osephMorone and Damian Saccocio, "A Success-Based Competitiveness Policy,"
Issues in Science and Technoloqy, Winter 1992/93,62.
Igsteven Schlosstein, 'High Noon for the Rising Sun," Journal of Business Strateay,
October 1993,4449.
22
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makers should therefore be to help firms build and maintain technology
leadership.
Technology leadership is driven by competition. If there remains a serious
obstacle in the U.S. to continuous improvement in cost and performance, it lies
not in the financial environment or the managerial practices reinforced by that
environment, but in the government mission-oriented culture that still
predominates in U.S. research institutions. The culture of technology
development and engineering in agencies such as the Department of Defense,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Department of Energy
emphasizes one-of-a-kind, high performance systems that require customized,
and often manual, manufacturing - precisely the reverse of the demands placed
on high-tech firms competing head to head with the Japanese. 20
Technology leadership begins with creative and well-trained individuals
pursuing radical and generational innovation. To many observers, the solution is
simple; more interactions between industry and universities and fewer between
universities and the government-agency culture. The more university-based
science and engineering are oriented to problems of importance to industry, the
more likely it is that students will be exposed to the need to balance high
performance with low cost, and elegant design with manufa~turability.~'

*'~lexanderTulloch, "The Strategic Management of Change,"Manaaement Decision,
May 1993,62-65.
21~illiarn
Starbuck, "Strategizingin the Real World," International Journal of
Technologv Management, February 1993,77-83.
23
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Success offers a clear and consistent message: Technology leadership is
shaped by general management - by the strategic focus that it displays, by the
consistency with which it applies that focus, by its pursuit of total rather than just
high-end leadership, by its willingness and ability to pioneer continuous as well
as discontinuous improvements in technology, and by a style of decision-making
that is characterized by a willingness to learn by doing in the face of uncertainty
and that is driven by the imperative to stay ahead rather than by financial

If technology leadership is shaped by general management, two logically
distinct approaches could be to:
Change the financial environment. Sustained leadership in high-tech
markets requires the ability to periodically renew businesses by pioneering
radical and generational innovations. This ability requires general management
that is willing and able to persist through decade-long periods of low or negative
returns coupled with high investment. This does not mean that continuous
incremental innovation within existing businesses is unimportant. But leadership
cannot be maintained if it is not first established and then periodically renewed
through the much more ambitious, risky, and painful discontinuous innovations.
Changing managerial practices directly. A different but complementary
approach is to devise policies similar to R&D and investment tax credits that
would directly influence managerial behavior. To be effective, any such

22 Suresh Kotha, "Strategic Action Generation," Stratesic Manasernent Journal, March
1995,24-25.
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measures must have a significant impact on cash flow. The 25 percent tax credit
on increases in R&D spending that was instituted in 1981 has too small an effect
on cash flow to significantly alter a manager's decisions. And even if a larger
R&D tax credit were instituted, it still might not induce the kind of long-termoriented action required to build technology leadership, since in their current
form, R&D tax credits can just as easily be used to subsidize minor modifications
of existing product^.'^
Effective Strategic Planning

What must U.S. enterprises do to help themselves compete in global
markets?
Among the many alternatives, strategic planning has been a highly
successful method of competing in an ever-changing global marketplace.
Strategic planning is the identification and creation of competitive advantage. It
deals with the development of brand positioning as a central focus and the
necessary tools to make that focus live; to secure resources and commitment; to
monitor progress and help understand and embody external influences and
changesz4The systematic approach to the planning process is key and involves
the following areas of concentration: the marketing audit, a thorough analysis of
both internal and external environments; SWOT analysis, examining the key
conditions of the product, the market and the competition; defining new

23~orone,
Saccocio, "A Success-Based Competitiveness Policy," 65-66.
2 4 ~ Elango,
.
"Managing Strategic Flexibility: Key to Effective Performance," Journal of
General Manaaernent, Spring 1995,60-67.
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objectives; determining the best ways to meet these objectives; and finally, how
will they be rneas~red.'~

Strategic planning is about the future development of a product or
company and therefore must contain vision, as it is vision which provides the
context for growth. Marketing by existing conditions has very limited growth
opportunity, particularly as so few categories are experiencing incremental
volume gains. Often the planning process does not allow for plans to extend
beyond the immediate year ahead, as the management mindset is one of results,
results, results, and yet in so many cases a 3-or-5 year plan is essential to
defining how a product or technology will evolve. This is not to say that plans
should not change as times and conditions change. On the contrary, products
can be long-term equities that corporations should nurture carefully. The
planning document, and in particular the positioning statement, needs to be
reviewed constantly. It has to be a working document, an operational blueprint,
not a "file-fi~ler".'~
Japan and the United States will continue to compete and there will
always be a leader in that competition. It will depend on the decision makers of
America's production industries to make the decisive moves that will help
improve American competitiveness on a global scale.

25~ernard
Reirnan, "The New Strategic Leadership,"Plannina Review, October 1994,
6.
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Renda, "Are Your Organization and Business Strategies at Odds?,"
Supervisorv Manapernent, March 1994,lO-12.

References

Grayson

Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies

References

Aurbach, Stuart. "Sweating Bullets." Washington Post, 25 March 1991.
Contained specific information related to CD-ROM technology and
the Japanese hold on that technology.
Bates, Donald. "Wanted: A Strategic Planner for the 1990's." Journal of General
Management, Autumn 1992, 51-53.
A fact filled article that contains data specifically related to the
lithographic stepper industry. An essential industry for computer
enterprises.
Bleakley, Fred. "Auto Industry Manufacturing Machinery." Asian Wall Street
Journal, 28 June 1993.
The Journal always keeps abreast of the major changes in many
industries, the auto industry is no exception. This article discussed the
stranglehold that many Japanese parts manufacturers maintain on a
global perspective.
Carbon Fiber: Holding the Edge. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office) 1989, 138.
Government publication that discusses the uses and future
potential of carbon fiber and the technology that is required in its
production. Japan is identified as a major U.S. supplier with no other
major U.S. producers.
Choate, Pat. Agent of Influence, Agents of Influence: How Japan's Lobbyists in
the United States Manipulate America's Political and Economic System.
(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1990), 8.
Another perspective of how the economic and political system of
the U.S. is up for sale. This work sets the stage for how Japan uses all
avenues of ingress to develop the monopolies that they will control in the
future.
Elango, B. "Managing Strategic Flexibility: Key to Effective Performance."
Journal of General Management, Spring 1995, 60-67.
Discussion of senior management's need to concentrate on
introducing strategic flexibility in their organizations. Strategic flexibility

Grayson

Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies

enables an organization to quickly take advantage of external
opportunities, which is a necessity in improving profit levels in a volatile
international business environment. In my opinion, flexibility and
adaptability is paramount for success.
Fallows, James. Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic
and Political System. (New York: Pantheon Press, 1994), 423.
A comprehensive work that attempts to identify the methods and
strategies employed by Japanese executives to gain economic
domination. Looking at the Sun was instrumental in helping to identify
what is actually transpiring in the game of world politics and economics.
Fingleton, Eamonn. "The Tokyo Gambit." Financial World, 20 June 1995,22-26.
Article witten by longtime Japan resident who helps to identify
Japanese world monopolies. His insight into the Japanese culture helps
westerners understand the Japanese business mentality.
Fingleton, Eamonn. Blindside. (New York: Buttonwood Press, 1995), 68-80.
Comprehensive work that intensifies its focus on the subtleties of
Japanese culture and the misunderstandings and misinterpretations of
the western press. How those misinterpretations have allowed Japanese
industries to gain deep inroads into what was formerly U.S. industry
dominated territories.
Forester, Tom. Silicon Samurai. (NewYork: Oxford Press, 1993), 129.
A work that gives an in-depth view how silicon and silicon
technologies are employed in the all-encompassing computer industry. An
intense perspective of how Japan dominates the silicon industry and how
it plans to maintain its dominance.
Hamilton, David. "Specialty Materials." Asian Wall Street Journal, 30 August
1993.
Article highlighting lithographic stepper technology. Discusses how
Japan dominates the stepper market.
Hart, Stuart. "How Strategy-making Processes Can Make a Difference." Strategic
Management Journal, May 1994,251-255.

Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies

Grayson

Article that asks tough questions and suggests methods of
improvement for small and large companies. Useful for this project
to give greater depth to the choices involved in making a strategy
decision.
Karatsu, Hajime. Nikkei Weekly, 9 June 1994.
Auto parts industry in Japan is one of the strongest in the
world. Japan supplies parts to all major manufacturers and
maintains strong links with their secondary parts markets.
Kotha, Suresh. "Strategic Action Generation." Strategic Management Journal,
March 1995, 24-25.
Another series of excellent strategy suggestions. Useful due
to its more aggressive policy suggestions.
Moore, Sarah. "Making Sense of Strategic Management: Towards a Constructive
Guide." Management Decision, January 1995, 19-24.
The complexity of strategic planning is placing heavy
cognitive demands on corporate strategists. This article helps to
identify factors that make the strategic management process a
required necessity for companies today.
Morone, Joseph and Saccocio, Damian. "A Success-Based Competitiveness
Policy." Issues in Science and Technology, Winter 1992193, 62.

A discussion of the competitive issues involved in the business
battles of the U.S. and Japan. An insightful article using facts gathered
from U.S. government sources tracking the competitive struggle with
Japan.
Reiman, Bernard. "The New Strategic Leadership." Planning Review, October
1994, 6.
Strategic leadership provides organizations with a long-term vision
that influences people toward achieving desired results. This article
highlights a conference of The Planning Forum. Insights from leaders of
business related to the necessity for strategic planning.
Renda, Thomas. "Are Your Organization and Business Strategies at Odds?"
Supervisory Management, March 1994, 10-12.

Grayson

Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies

Companies succeed because they have well-planned strategies
that are supported by systems which are consistent with these strategies.
This article was useful in that it discussed several successful strategies of
international businesses.
Schlosstein, Steven. "High Noon for the Rising Sun." Journal of Business
Strategy, October 1993, 44-49.
Another discussion of the merits involved with long-term
perspectives in business and the pitfalls involved with the short-sighted
perspective. A useful insight to the competitive environment of
international business.
Solomon Brothers Research. Forbes, 13 November 1989.
The data gathered by this firm helps companies worldwide make
effective decisions based on accurate information. Data compiled relating
to large Japanese organizations was extremely useful in helping to
identify Japanese monopolies.
Starbuck, William. "Strategizing in the Real World." International Journal of
Technology Management, February 1993, 77-83.
Strategic management is serious business. Strategy suggestions
for American business. Techniques and policies to improve international
business competitiveness.
Trezise, Philip. Brooking Review. Winter 1989190, 12.
An interesting perspective from the American think tanks. Let the
market leader dominate the market no matter the circumstance, the true
economists perspective. This article supplies a perspective that is
predominant with the bottom-line short-termed perspective of typical
American businesses.
Tulloch, Alexander. "The Strategic Management of Change." Management
Decision, May 1993, 62-65.
A discussion of how U.S. business executive management and
government policies currently operate. A method of operation that is
restraining the full competitiveness capabilities of American businesses.
Suggestions for managerial change.

